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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
10 Is the Miranda warning required upon making a 
custodial stop in a drunk driving case prior to any interrogation 
about alcohol and related matters?" 
2. Were field sobriety tests conducted July 10, 
1984, affirmative acts of evidence governed by Hansen v. Owens, 
Utah, 619 P.. 2d 315 (1980)., although o vex: r i lied by American Fork v. 
Cosgrove, Utah, 701 P.2d 1069 (1985)? 
3. Was a breath test which was requested and refused 
July 10, 1QQ/'( an affirmative act of evidence governed by Hansen, 
supra? 
4. May American Fork, < . '^  : "^-roactively 
without doing violence to due process of the law? 
5.' Notwithstanding the civil nature of Utah's 
Implied Consent Law, Utah Code Ann, 195^, >s amenuc--.., . . - •-- * 1, 
must the Miranda warning be given prior to custodial interrogation 
re a breath test before a refusal may be admitted into evidence 
at trial for the criminal charge of drunk driving? 
6. By analogy, applying Hansen, supra, if the 
Miranda warnI ng i s i :eqi ii red pri or t:o custodial interrogation rel-
ative to testimonial evidence, is a full constitutional warning 
against self-incrimination required nrl. r to affirmative acts 
e v i d e r I c e b e i n g a d m i s s i b l e a t t r I * r • r tin I n a 1 c h a r g e of 
drunk driving? 
This issue is presently before this court in the pending 
-1 -
case of Sandy City v. Lloyd E. Larson, No. 19754, appeal filed 
February 14, 1984, and was recognized in Lloyd E. Larson v. Fred 
Schwendiman, No. 20186, decided December 12, 1985, 24 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 19. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a drunk driving case. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The appellant was accused by an Amended Information, 
deleting the . 087o provision, for having committed the offense of 
Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §41-6-44(a). 
A non-jury trial in absentia was held March 7, 1985, 
before the Honorable K. Roger Bean, Judge of the Fourth Circuit 
Court, Layton Department, Davis County, State of Utah, Case No. 
84-TF-669. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS 
March 7, 1985, the appellant was found guilty of the 
above offense. 
April 17, 1985, the appellant was sentenced for the 
above offense. The sentence was stayed for seven (7) days pending 
appeal to the district court. 
April 22, 1985, the appellant timely filed in the 
circuit court his Notice of Appeal and his $600.00 Appeal Bond, 
which his sureties had executed April 18, 1985. 
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April 30, 1985, the appellant filed his Designation of 
Record. The entire recnr . . . . - . .^ rding of the 
proceedings of March * . *^, :n • K *- /:rcu:c court, was prepared, 
cert" * ' ,*-.'•;• : I'^LCL CUUIL. 
August 1J, 19S3, Lhe nppea.^  :: m n *-he circuit court was 
heard before f h^ ,i:^r-rih^.- Douglas I,. Corr.aby - '..he Sec:>ru: Judicial 
D Lst. ^ • < ': , • ".i - :: .. 
4929. 
August 23, 1985, the district; court affirmed the circuit 
court, A copy of Lhe d u U i c L C U U I L ' •> huhiu iin \ppeai i : in-
included in the Addendum to this brief. (Addendum, p. 21) 
September 1 9, 1985, the appellant timely filed his 
Notice of Appeal and Designation of Record for his appeal to this 
court. 
;;TAIF;?IE?II OF RELEVANT FACTS FOR REVIFVJ 
It was stipulated and permitted thac the prosecution 
could make a proffer of proof for its version of the facts of the 
case and that the delense would huvc .in oppurtui li ty to state for 
the record his positions and motions. (T.3) 
The lower court agreed that after the respondent had made 
its proffer of proof, the appellant.''i ,u fj-niey C"i:ld I T J S S examine 
the arresting officer relative to the constitutional aspects of 
the f i el d sc )bi:i et:\ tests (1. 4) 
Respondent's Proffer of Proof 
While traveling in opposite directions on 1-15 in Davis 
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County at about 3:10 a.m., July 10, 1984, the arresting officer 
checked the appellant through radar as speeding 68 mph. (T.4) 
After turning around, it took the arresting officer 
approximately two miles to catch up to the appellant's vehicle, (T.5 
Following that, the arresting officer saw two lane 
changes twice, left wheels drove over the lane divider and a 
third time, the left wheel completely crossed over the lane 
divider without signalling. (T.5) 
The vehicle was stopped at that time. (T.5) There 
was an odor of alcohol on the appellant's breath. (T.5) The 
arresting officer asked the appellant how much he had had to 
drink. He indicated a couple of beers. (T.5) 
The arresting officer asked the appellant to submit to 
tests. (T.5) The appellant replied, "I will." (T.5) No 
Miranda warning was given prior to that. (T.6) 
The arresting officer gave the appellant three field 
sobriety tests. (T.6) 
Following field sobriety tests, the appellant was 
placed under arrest. (T.7) 
Appellant's Cross Examination 
The appellant was not arrested for speeding 68 mph. 
(T.16) 
The appellant was not arrested for changing lanes (T.16) 
wihout signalling. (Ta5) 
The arresting officer did not form an opinion that the 
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appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol merely by 
his speeding or changing of lanes. (T.17) 
The appellant was Mformallyff placed under arrest for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol (T.10), after the 
arresting officer had smelled the odor of alcohol on the appellant's 
breath (T.17), after he had given him the field sobriety tests 
(To 10 and TQ17), and before he had given him the Miranda warning. 
Before the appellant was uformally,f arrested (T. 10) , 
he was detained by the arresting officer at the time that he 
stopped him. (T.10) 
Although the arresting officer did not feel the appellant 
was in custody, he did not give him the opportunity to 
leave the scene. (T.10) He would have stopped him if he had 
just kept going. (T.10) Once he had stopped him, he would not 
have let him drive away on his free will. (T.10) 
The appellant did not have his freedom to leave. (T.10) 
The arresting officer was asked, lfUhether we call it 
'detention1 or 'custody, 'loss of freedom,1 'arrest' or 'whatever,1 
you agree, don't you, that he was not free to go without your 
attempting to stop him?" (T.10) 
The arresting officer answered, "Yes, I do.1' (T.ll) 
It was after that, and before the Miranda warning was 
given, that the appellant made statements to the arresting officer, 
and they talked back and forth. (T.ll) 
At no time, prior to having conversation with him, nor 
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prior to having him perform the field sobriety tests, did the 
arresting officer advise the appellant of his Miranda rights. 
(T.ll) Nor did he at any time explain to him that there were 
constitutional rights in addition to Miranda. (T.ll and T.12) 
The arresting officer never told the appellant that 
the Federal Constitution against self-incrimination said that he did 
not have to be a "witness against himself. 
The arresting officer did not explain to the appellant 
the distinction between the Federal Constitution and the Constitu-
tion of Utah that says he is not compelled to give any "evidence" 
against himself. (T012) 
The arresting officer did not tell the appellant that 
he did not have to take the field tests. (T.12) 
The arresting officer did not tell the appellant that 
he had a constitutional right not to give any evidence against 
himself, which the arresting officer considered field sobriety 
tests to be evidence against the appellant. (T.12) 
The arresting officer was asked, "And you do consider 
the field tests to be evidence against him, don't you?" He 
answered, "I consider it as — it's a component of the entire 
picture." (T.12) 
The arresting officer was then asked, "Yeah. And that 
that was a part of your judgment in determining that he was under 
the influence, wasn't it?" (T.12) He answered, "Yes. It was." 
(T.13) 
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The appellant requested and was denied his right to 
have a lawyer present. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE CASE 
The district court specifically found the officer made 
a custodial stop at the time he pulled the appellant over relative 
to the incident of the evening of the arrest. (Addendum, p. 21 ) 
This holding established the requirement of Miranda 
prior to any interrogation for admissible evidence at the trial 
of a criminal charge of drunk driving. The Miranda warning would 
be required as to all interrogation, whether relative to the 
field sobriety tests or the breath test. 
Furthermore, applying Hansen, supra, the affirmative 
acts of the field sobriety tests would be inadmissible at the 
trial for the criminal charge of drunk driving, as being in 
violation of the appellant's constitutional right against self-
incrimination for the reasons stated in Point I of this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF FIELD 
SOBRIETY TESTS AND REFUSAL OF 
BREATH TEST. 
The appellant moved to suppress the evidence of the 
field sobriety tests on constitutional grounds. (T.18) 
The lower court denied the appellant's Motion to Suppress 
all evidence relating to the field sobriety tests. (T.23) 
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Chiseled in the marble above the front steps of the 
United States Supreme Court -- "Equal Justice Under Law" — 
glaringly tells the world that what is fair for one is fair for 
all in any given situation0 
This is the cornerstone of United States Const,, 
Amends. V, VI, and XIV: 
Amend V provides for the right against 
self-incrimination in that an accused 
does not have to be a witness against 
himself and further provides for due 
process of law. 
Amend VI provides for the assistance 
of counsel. 
Amend XIV provides for due process of 
law and equal protection of law. 
This is also the cornerstone of Utah Const., Art. I, 
§§7, 12, and 27: 
§7 provides for due process of law. 
§12 provides for the assistance of 
counsel. 
§27 provides for frequent recurrence 
to fundamental principles which are 
essential to the security of indiv-
idual rights. 
The word "equal" means the same, even, alike, identical 
neither inferior nor superior, just, uniform, matched, level, 
par, commensurate, balanced, nor more no less, share and share 
alike, 6 of one and 1/2 dozen of the other, all for one and one 
for all, half and half, as good as, fairness, distinction without 
a difference.... (Words and Phrases, Webster's New International 
Dictionary, Unabridged Edition, Roget's Thesaurus of English 
Words and Phrases, and cases galore from all jurisdictions.) 
The purpose of due process and equal protection of law 
is to give all persons similarly situated the guaranteed rights 
to fair and equal treatment without placing burdens or privileges 
on different persons within the same classification exercising 
their fundamental rights. 
The field sobriety tests violate this purpose. One of 
the most fundamental rights of an accused is the right to a fair 
trial. And the right to a fair trial incorporates the right to 
be advised of and to confront the evidence to be used against 
the accused, (Pitchess v. Superior Court, Cal., 522 P.2d 305 
(1974).) 
In the instant case, the appellant was not advised of 
his rights to confront the evidence (field sobriety tests) to be 
used against him at trial to entitle him to an intelligent defense 
in light of all relevant and accessible evidence. In fact, the 
appellant was not advised that he did not have to take the field 
sobriety tests, nor that the results could be used against him as 
evidence at trial. (Ta12) 
He was not advised that he had the right to remain silent 
once he became a suspect to the criminal offense of driving while 
under the influence of alcohol. He became such a suspect when 
the arresting officer smelled the odor of alcohol on the appellant's 
breath (T.5 and T.17) and after he had taken the field sobriety 
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tests. (T.74 T.10, T.ll, T.17, and T.18) 
According to one version of the testimony of the arrest-
ing officer, the appellant was a suspect even prior to the above 
reasons, i.e., when the arresting officer saw him speeding 68 mph 
(T.16), change lanes (T.5, T.16, and T.17), without signalling 
(T.5), and his driving pattern. (T.17) 
A contrary version of the testimony of the arresting 
officer was that he did not form an opinion that the appellant was 
driving while under the influence of alcohol at this time merely 
from the 68 mph and the change of lanes. (T.17) If this version 
is accepted, the arresting officer had no probable cause to stop 
the appellant for driving while under the influence of alcohol. 
Consequently, the arrest that followed would have been an illegal 
arrest, and the appellant's Motions to Suppress (T.18) and Dismiss 
(T.19) should not have been denied (T.23), because all offered 
evidence that follows an illegal arrest is illegal and inadmissible. 
Under any of these situations, the appellant was indeed 
a suspect before he was "formally" arrested. 
The word "arrest" is not a classic word of art or 
mystery. There is nothing magic about a "formal" arrest. I suppose 
some think you actually have to say the word before it has a 
meaning. Those who do are attempting to justify themselves by 
not having to afford constitutional rights to others, i.e., such, 
as in this case, as reading the Miranda warning only after the 
exact word is stated0 Otherwise, they would have to hide behind 
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the word "investigatory.!f That is precisely what the respondent 
is attempting to do in this case. 
The High Court and many, many more hold otherwise. 
A person is under constructive arrest, at least, and 
in custody if any law enforcement officer deprives another of 
his freedom of action in any significant way. If that person is 
to be questioned under those circumstances, there exists custodial 
interrogation, which is defined as questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a suspect has been taken into custody 
and otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. 
(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 
(1966).) (See, also, Salt Lake City v. Carner, Utah, 664 P.2d 
1168 (1983), J. Durham, concurring.) Miranda held than an accused 
must be advised of certain constitutional rights, one of which is 
the right to remain silent during custodial interrogation. Another 
is the right to have his lawyer present. (U.S. Const., Amend VI.) 
Our Utah Supreme Court has refined Miranda even further. 
In Holman v. Cox, Utah, 598 P.2d 1331 (1979), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that a driver, suspected of driving under the influence 
of alcohol, is at that point involved in a criminal proceeding and 
must be given the Miranda warning. The ruling in Holman was 
reaffirmed in Smith v. Cox, Utah, 609 P.2d 1332 (1980). There it 
was held that the defendant had the constitutional right not to 
give evidence against himself and must be given the Miranda warning 
if his statements are to be admitted in a criminal proceeding 
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against him. The same reasoning would apply to the appellant's 
refusal or other conversations relative to the breath test and 
the trial for the criminal charge of drunk driving, even more so, 
because he had been formally arrested and still refused his 
request for counsel. 
In this case, the respondent contends that the question-
ing was investigatory (T.6) only and was done in the way of the 
general inquiry type, and the appellant was not in custody (T.IO) 
or under arrest. (T.ll) Therefore, the Miranda warning was not 
necessary0 This contention is contrary to the facts. 
Miranda (custodial interrogation) can be understood 
more clearly by interpreting an earlier United States Supreme 
Court decision. 
In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 845 S.Ct. 1758, 
1758 L.Ed.2d 977 (1364), the Court held that a defendant is entitled 
to the assistance of counsel when the interrogation begins to 
focus on a particular suspect and that no statement elicited by 
the police during the interrogation may be used against him in 
a criminal trial. 
From the very nature of the offense, a suspected drunk 
driver comes within the protection of the principle developed in 
Escobedo as soon as he is stopped by the police officer. At the 
point of detention, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry 
into an unsolved crime and has begun to focus on that particular 
suspect. 
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The appellant contends the facts will support that he 
was in a custodial interrogation atmosphere at the time he made 
the statement he seeks to be suppressed. 
On the 10th day of July, 1984, near Antelope Drive in 
Layton, Davis County, the arresting officer was traveling south-
bound on 1-15 (T.8) when he first observed the appellant at 3:00 
a.m., according to his police report. (T.8 and T.9) The appellant 
was in a vehicle traveling northbound from the opposite direction 
at a fast rate of speed. Radar checked the speed at 68 mph. (T.4) 
The citation shows the date and 3:02 a.m. as the time. (T.9) The 
arresting officer testified that 3:02 a.m. was the time the 
offense took place. (T.9) He and a companion paramedic turned 
on the vehicle. (T.4) They had to turn around. It took them 
approximately two miles to catch up with it. Following that, they 
saw two lane changes twice, left wheels drove over the lane div-
ider and a third time, the left wheel completely crossed over the 
lane divider without signalling. The vehicle was stopped at that 
time (T.,5), and the arresting officer asked (T.5) the appellant 
for his driver's license, which was produced with no problem. 
The questioning was initiated by the arresting officer. (T.5) 
The questioning was pursued by the arresting officer. (T.5) The 
appellant indicated a couple of beers. (T.5) The arresting officer 
asked the third question by inquiring where the appellant was 
going. (T.5) He replied Salt Lake. (T.5) The arresting officer 
asked the fourth question by requesting the appellant to submit 
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to tests. (T.5) The appellant replied, "I will.11 (T.5) There 
was an odor of alcohol on the appellant's breath. (T.5) 
The facts established the questioning was initiated by 
the law enforcement officer, a deputy sheriff of Davis County. 
There was no Miranda warning given prior to that time. 
(T.6) The respondent contended it was not necessary because it was 
still investigatory. 
The next element to be considered is whether or not 
the questioning was custodial. 
The arresting officer was asked, "Okay. Now, when you 
stopped him, did you give him any opportunity to leave the scene 
if he wanted? Or did you feel that you had him in custody?" 
(T.10) 
The arresting officer testified that he did not feel 
that the appellant was in custody at that time. (T.10) He was 
asked what would happen if he just kept going. He said that he 
would have been obligated to stop him again to complete his 
investigatory purposes. (T.10) He was then asked, "In other words, 
once he was stopped, you wouldn't have let him drive away on his 
own free will and done nothing, would you?" He replied, "No. I 
wouldn't/' (T.10) He was then asked, "So, don't you agree that 
you had him in custody?" He replied, "I agree that he was detained 
at that time." (T.10) He was further asked, "Yeah. In other 
words, he did not have his freedom to leave, did he? Whether we 
call it 'detention' or 'custody,' 'loss of freedom,' 'arrest,' or 
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'whatever,1 you agree, don't you, that he was not free to go 
without your attempting to stop him?M (T.10) He replied, "Yes. 
I do.11 (T.ll) He was asked, "And it was after that that he made 
statements to you, wasn't it? In other words, you stopped hin, 
you weren't going to let him go, and that's when you started to 
question him, and he started talking back to you." He replied, 
"Yes, I did." (T.ll) 
Until that time, the arresting officer had not given 
the appellant the Miranda warning. (T.ll) In fact, he did not 
give him the Miranda warning until he arrested him, which was 
after the questioning and after the field sobriety tests. (T.ll) 
The arresting officer was asked, "Okay. Now, did you at 
any time, prior to having him perform the field tests, did you at 
any time tell him of his Miranda rights?" (T.ll) He replied, 
"No. I didn't," (T.ll) 
These facts fulfil all requirements to meet the standards 
of the necessity of giving the Miranda warning in this case. This, 
indeed, amounted to custodial interrogation. (1) The questioning 
was initiated by a law enforcement officer, (2) after tne suspect 
had been taken into custody, and (3) otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way. 
Therefore, all statements made by the appellant should 
be suppressed and not used against him in any criminal action 
arising out of the events in this matter. 
Otherwise, he would be deprived of his fundamental rights 
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afforded him by the law against self-incrimination, due process, 
and equal protection. United States Const., Amends V and XIV, 
and Utah Const., Art. I, §§7 and 12.) 
Without the appellant's statement in response to the 
arresting officer?s request for field sobriety tests, wherein he 
responded, ffI will,11 there would be no basis for the admissibility 
of the results of those tests in a criminal action against him. 
Nevertheless, even with that statement, the results of 
those tests should still be suppressed, because they are in 
violation of his same constitutional rights as mentioned above. 
(Self-incrimination, Due Process, and Equal Protection.) 
On the surface of the simplicity of those two words, 
first impressions could convey consent by the appellant and no 
coercion by the arresting officer. But, "It Ain't Necessarily 
So.Tf (Porgy and Bess, Gershwin, 
Due process boils down to fundamental fairness. Equal 
protection means all of us have the same constitutional rights, 
which no one can take from us, unless we voluntarily and knowingly 
surrender them. The words 'Voluntarily11 and "knowingly11 have 
legalistic meaning. Let us now delve deeper as we direct our 
thoughts toward our rights against self-incrimination as it applies 
to field sobriety tests. 
The overwhelming weight of authority holds that a suspect 
or an accused cannot be compelled to perform field sobriety tests. 
(Salt Lake City v. Carner, Utah, 664 P.2d 1168 (1983), Justice 
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Durham's concurring opinion.) 
The overwhelming weight of authority holds that field 
sobriety tests do no violate a suspect's or an accused's consti-
tutional right against self-incrimination. (See, e.g., People v. 
Ramirez, 199 Colo. 367, 374 n. 8, 609 P.2d 616, 620 n. 8 (1980), 
citing cases from nineteen jurisdictions); State v. City of 
Tuscon, 12 Ariz. App. 529, 472 P.2d 952 (1970); 3 R. Erwin, 
Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal-Civil, §32.02(4) (1982 
and Supp. 1982).) 
The reasoning for this view is because the constitu-
tional right against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial 
evidence. Field sobriety tests are not testimonial evidence. 
They are affirmative acts of physical evidence. 
U.S. Const., Amend XIV, provides that an accused does 
not have to be a \>zitness against himself. A witness gives testi-
monial evidence. 
Within the above overwhelming authority, many states 
have the same wording in their constitutions. Some states have 
other wording in their constitutions, but such has been interpreted 
to mean the same. 
Applying the law at the time of arrest, Utah Const., 
Art. I, §12 provides that an accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself. Evidence is an all inclusive term. 
Although it includes testimonial evidence, it also includes 
physical evidence, e.g., documents, properties, acts, etc. 
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Notwithstanding interpretations from other jurisdic-
tions, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted its constitution's 
provision against self-incrimination as being more inclusive than 
limiting it to testimonial evidence, and includes therein affirm-
ative acts which may not be compelled. (Hansen v. Owens, Utah, 
619 P.2d 315 (1980).) It is recognized that American Fork v. 
Cosgrove, Utah, 701 P.2d 1069 (1985) overruled Hansen, supra. 
However, it cannot be applied retroactively without doing violenc 
to due process and ex post facto concepts. (U.S. Const., Art. I, 
§10.) 
Since field sobriety tests may not be compelled, they 
constitute affirmative acts which are included as evidence within 
the meaning of Utah's constitutional provision against self-
incr iminat ion. 
Therefore, the appellant had the constitutional right 
against self-incrimination relative to the administered field 
sobriety tests. 
It is recognized that the appellant may voluntarily 
and knowingly waive that right and consent to the performance of 
field sobriety tests. However, before the appellant could volun-
tarily and knowingly waive that right, he would have to be proper 
advised of that right. 
The arresting officer did not tell the appellant that 
he had the constitutional right not to give any evidence against 
himself. (T.12) He did not tell him that he was not compelled to 
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perform the field sobriety tests. (T.12) 
Consequently, the appellant was not properly advised 
of his constitutional right against self-incrimination relative 
to the evidence of the performed field sobriety tests, notwith-
standing his saying, "I will,11 and his performance of the tests. 
Therefore, all evidence pertaining to the performed 
field sobriety tests in this matter should be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Without evidence of the field sobriety tests, all that 
would remain would be opinion evidence relative to the charged 
offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol. 
The opinion evidence would be limited to (1) 68 mph 
(T.4 and T.16), (2) driving pattern (T.5, T.16, and T.17), (3) 
speed (T.5 and T.18), and (4) odor of alcohol. 
The arresting officer had seen others speed and have 
similar driving patterns who were not driving under the influence 
of alcohol. (T.17) The arresting officer did not issue citations 
to the appellant for his speeding or driving pattern. (T.16) He 
did not know alcohol was involved until he smelled the odor on 
the appellantfs breath. He still did not have an opinion that 
the appellant had been driving under the influence until he had the 
appellant perform the field sobriety tests, because it was not 
until after that that he formally arrested the appellant for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol, (T,10) 
The judgment of the lower courts should be reversed; or, 
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at least, be remanded for a new trial without any evidence per-
taining to the field sobriety tests or refusal relative to the 
breath test. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
The appellant hereby requests oral argument in this 
matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this < (~^ >- day of March, 1986. 
X ^ - , ( 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2467 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the U"^ ''-^ day of March, 1986, 
four (4) copies of Brief of Appellant were served on the Office 
of the Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114. 
'
 (
.^A^-\~V' *—*-< 
PHIL L. HANSEN, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
EARL W. EAST, ] 
Defendant. 
1 RULING ON APPEAL 
1 Criminal No. 4929 
This appda- came before the court on August 13, 1985, with 
Robert B. Hart ;:.cearing for the plaintiff and Phil L. Hansen 
appearing for zae defendant. Counsel requested a one week con-
tinuance which the court granted. Counsel thereafter requested 
a ruling based upon the briefs filed with the court. The court 
now rules on the appeal. 
The arresting officer in this case stopped the defendant for 
speeding. There was also a driving pattern involving two lane 
changes without signaling and also the left wheels driving over 
the lane divider. The officer could smell an odor of alcohol on 
the defendant's breath on approaching him. At this point the of-
ficer could have issued the defendant a citation for speeding and 
allowed him to _ ~eed on his way. However, he suspected driving 
under the infl. •-•r.?a of alcohol. This was a custodial stop. Ob-
viously the defendant was not free to leave. The defendant urges 
the court to require the Miranda warning at this time. Mere sus-
picion of a traffic off .v.-.se does net require the Miranda warning. 
The officer asked the defendant how much he had to drink and he 
replied two beers. The officer properly requested the defendant 
to take field sobriety tests. The defendant consented. These 
tests did not require the officer to advise the defendant of a 
right against self-incrimination. The Utah Supreme Court in 
American Fork City vs. Crosgrove, 11 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 stated: 
" . . . History supports the conclusion, ac-
cepted by the vast majority of authorities, that 
the commonlaw privilege is limited to testimonial 
and communicative evidence only and not to evidence 
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of a real of physical nature such as that obtained 
from a breathalyzer test," 
The field sobriety tests are not "testimonial and communicative 
evidence." 
After the field sobriety tests were given, the officer for-
mally arrested the defendant for DUI and gave him his Miranda 
warning-. -This was the appropriate procedure. The Utah Supreme 
Court in Holman vs. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (1979) said: 
" . . . However, when a driver suspected of driv-
ing under the influence is arrested, he is at that point 
involved in a criminal proceeding and must be given the 
Miranda Warning if his subsequent statements are to be 
admitted in a criminal proceeding against him . . . " 
The Cox case involved the Driver License Division. The defendant 
urges that an arrest takes place when the defendant's free right 
of movement is stopped. This is technically correct, but the 
Supreme Court has never required the Miranda warning at the point, 
On the other hand it has not permitted officers to ask extensive 
questions under the guise of custodial investigation. In the 
case at hand the officer reasonably suspected DUI after giving 
the field sobriety tests. Having arrested the defendant for DUI 
it was proper to ask him to take a chemical test. 
The defendant's right against self-incrimination was not 
violated in this case and the lower court appropriately ruled. 
This case is ordered returned to the Layton Department of the 
Fourth Circuit Court with directions to execute the sentence. 
Dated August 23, 1985. 
BY THlT\COURT: 
JUDG? 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy Qf the foregoing Ruling to Robert B. Hart, Davis 
County Attorney's Office, Farmington, Utah and to Phil L. Hansen, 
800 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on August 26, 
1985. 
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